Introduction
Demir is one of the most interesting and intriguing judgments on eecTurkey Association Law delivered recently by the Court of Justice (henceforth; the Court).1 It is another building block in the case law on the standstill clauses in Association Law, which has been categorized to form the fourth phase in the development of that case law.2 Demir is puzzling since on the one hand, it brings Association law closer to eu law by introducing the "rule of reason," i.e. the possibility for Member States to derogate from the free movement principle, here from the standstill clause, on a ground justified by an overriding reason in the public interest. Interestingly, on the other hand, it also distinguishes Association law further from eu law by introducing the possibility to derogate from a standstill obligation, which has so far been regarded as an absolute obligation under the latter.3
The case is worth discussing in detail, as it is the Court's most recent pronouncement on the scope of the standstill clause concerning free movement of workers that is Article 13 of Decision 1/80. The Court confirmed its previous finding that Article 13 should be interpreted as covering the rules applicable to a substantive and/or formal conditions governing first admission of Turkish workers into a Member State.4 When this finding is combined with the Court's subsequent ruling in Dogan,5 which concerned the family reunification rights * PhD candidate at the Europa Institute of Leiden University, the Netherlands. also, what the author considers to be, the two irreconcilable answers the Court provides to the two preliminary references referred by the Raad van State (the Council of State, court of last instance). As will be demonstrated below by both the arguments of the Advocate General as well as the brief overview provided by previous case law on the standstill clauses, the answer provided by the Court to the second question is not only inconsistent with the answer provided to the first, but also with its previous case law. In short, the puzzle is how to reconcile the second question with the first as well as with previous case law.
This case note begins by introducing the legal issues raised by Demir followed by the factual and legal background of the case. In addition to the relevant national law, the legal background contains an overview of the Court's past case law demonstrating the evolution of its interpretation of the standstill clauses. The latter overview enables one to put the Court's pronouncement in Demir into perspective. Subsequently, Advocate General Wahl's Opinion is discussed in detail as it provided a clear and coherent suggestion as to how the case was to be resolved. Interestingly, the answer suggested by the ag for the second question appears to be more consistent with the Court's previous case law than the answer provided by the Court itself in the judgment. Next, a brief summary of the Court's judgment as well as that of the Raad van State (the Council of State) is provided, which are followed by the author's comments. 
